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In this article I discuss three modes of terror. The first, derived from George 
Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-four, sees terror as an operation of the narcissistic fusion 
of self and other: terror is produced when the ways of the world are reduced 
entirely to the narcissistic confines of the self.1 The second conception of terror, 
which emerges from Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains of the Day, understands terror 
as a mode in which the desires of the self are forgone in deference to the authority 
to which one submits.2 This second mode of terror is thus characterized by a 
willing submission to the other. A third notion of terror, taken from Lucile 
Hadzihalilovic's recent film, Innocence (France, 2004), posits terror as something 
that must be accepted as part and parcel of human existence. From this 
perspective, terror is not something which the human being should strive to 
transcend (as occurs in Nineteen Eighty-four) or to which one must submit (as is 
the case with The Remains of the Day). Rather, for Innocence, terror is something 
which must be incorporated. 
These claims are made from within the context of psychoanalysis, most 
specifically by way of an understanding of Jean Laplanche's challenge to 
psychoanalysis: that the unconscious constitutes an 'internal etrangeretli' (alien-
ness) which is both put in place and maintained by an 'external etrangerete'.3 For 
Laplanche, the origins of the unconscious are external. The unconscious does not 
spontaneously or biologically arise from within the human subject, but is instead 
an internalized externality, an external alien inside me.4 Orwell's and Ishiguro's 
novels narrate ways of quashing or expelling the external, alien qualities of the 
unconscious, whereas Hadzihalilovic's extraordinary film offers a version of the 
implantation of the internal etrangerete which is fundamental to the formation of 
1. George Orwell, Nineteen Eightyfour (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989 [1949]). 
2. Kazuo Ishiguro, The Remains of the Day (London: Faber, 1989). 
3. Etrangerete, 'strangerness' or 'alien-ness' is Laplanche's neologism which attempts to 
capture the specific otherness of the unconscious, insofar as he conceives ofthe unconscious 
as an internalized otherness that is implanted externally by the child's interactions with 
other people. On this point, and on the translation into English of etrangerete, see John 
Fletcher's note in Laplanche, Essays on Others, ed. by John Fletcher (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1998), p. 62, n. 21. 
4. Jean Laplanche, 'La Revolution copernicienne inachevee, in La Revolution copernicienne 
inachevee: Travaux 1965-1992 (Paris: Aubier, 1992), pp. iii-xxxv. 
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the unconscious in a way that both acknowledges and maintains the etrangerete of 
that unconscious. 
Laplanche's challenge to psychoanalysis - based on his resurrection of the 
seduction theory - is one that opposes a self-generated or self-centred version of 
human subjectivity.s What the seduction theory makes evident for Laplanche is the 
radical other-centeredness of the human being, an otherness generated by an alien 
unconscious. This otherness may indeed be an avatar of terror, but it is a terror that 
lies at the decentred heart of the human, and only by accepting the otherness that 
the unconscious introduces can humans have the potential to appreciate not only 
the terrors of the unconscious, but also its pleasures. 
Nineteen Eighty-four and the Promise of Transcendence 
The regime headed by Big Brother, which rules over the state of Oceania in 
Nineteen Eighty-four, is both narcissistic and terroristic. Its brand of terror is 
narcissistic insofar as the people of Oceania are encouraged to reduce all their 
experiences to a conception of collective selfhood. As Martha Nussbaum has 
recently noted, in Nineteen Eighty-four 'the people of Oceania identify strongly 
with the state and see its triumphs as their own'.6 Their self-identity and self-
expression are fused with the hopes and aims of the state. 'Lacking a clear sense 
of the boundaries between self and other', Nussbaum writes, 'lacking, indeed, any 
robust sense of other, they gain narcissistic triumph through absorption in the 
state. 7 In Nineteen Eighty-four any sense of otherness is experienced only in terms 
ofthe self, as a form of collective self-expression: 'The collectivity is a vehicle of 
narcissistic triumph. '8 
This narcissistic absorption signifies a first form of terror, a terror which is 
organized by the quest for transcendence. That transcendence is one in which the 
boundaries between self and other are dissolved. In such a state of transcendence, 
the self and its others need no longer be opposed to one another, or even 
distinguished; rather, all determinations of otherness are reduced to the sphere of 
the self. Therefore, in Oceania, all forms of otherness are either subsumed by the 
self - others become like me - or are completely denied any relation to the self 
- others are enemies. It is in this way that the first form of terror carries with it 
the promise of transcendence: the other will either become part of me (and hence 
5. This distinction between self-centred (what Laplanche calls 'Ptolemaic') and other-centred 
('Copernican ') conceptions of psychoanalysis is central for Laplanche's writings. See, for 
example, the essays collected in La Revolution copernicienne inachevee. 
6. Martha C. Nussbaum, 'The Death of Pity: Orwell and American Political Life', in On 
Nineteen Eighty-Four: Orwell and Our Future, ed. by Abbott Gleason, Jack Goldsmith and 
Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 
pp. 279-99 (p. 288). 
7. Nussbaum, p. 288. 
8. Ibid. 
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its otherness will be transcended), or the other will exist only under the threat of 
its eradication (and will hence carry with it the promise of transcendence). 
It will come as no surprise that a totalitarian regime, such as that which is 
portrayed in Nineteen Eighty-four, is predicated on a promise of transcendence. 
But here I want to stress two issues. The first point to be noted is that the attempt 
to transcend all otherness is reflected in certain approaches to psychoanalysis 
which try to tame or even eradicate the alien otherness that constitutes the 
unconscious. That is to say, some forms of psychoanalysis,9 beginning with certain 
tendencies in Freud himself, see the unconscious as little more than an 
impediment - a pathology - the transcendence of which provides the basis for 
a psychoanalytic cure. 10 This tendency is perhaps nowhere more evident than in 
the notion of repressed memory, where the unconscious is posited as the outcome 
of a process of remembering which in one way or another 'goes wrong'. The 
unconscious itself is therefore understood as being automatically wrong, as 
pathological, and thus it only exists, from this perspective, as something to be 
overcome. Once the erroneous memories that have fallen into the unconscious are 
corrected and brought into contact with conscious thought, then a cure will have 
been performed. The cure is thus conceived as an eradication of that which is 
unconscious; the cure is based on an extinguishing of the unconscious. 11 
Therefore, in Nineteen Eighty-four, what transpires as a collective 
transcendence of otherness by way of a narcissistic fusion with the state can be 
mirrored in individual cases by a promise of transcending that otherness which 
forms the unconscious. This mirroring of collective transcendence by the promise 
of individual transcendence brings me to the second point I want to stress. I want 
to argue that Winston Smith, the hero of Nineteen Eighty-four, betrays a tendency 
towards a transcendence of the unconscious. In this way, his actions and 
aspirations end up being no different from those of the other citizens of Oceania. 
Winston is typically understood as someone who is deeply opposed to Big Brother 
and the totalitarian regime of Nineteen Eighty-four, indeed, this is how he 
understands his own actions: his actions are opposed to the Party. However, as 
Claude Lefort has deftly argued, Winston in fact exhibits all of the characteristics 
which ensure that ultimately he will accede to the regime. 12 In the final account, 
9. Laplanche's main targets are the proponents of ego psychology (e.g. Heinz Hartmann), but 
he is also critical of some of the trends that emerge from the British school of 
psychoanalysis (Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott). 
10. Laplanche is extremely critical of Freud in this respect. He criticizes Freud's belief that 
'everything conscious was previously unconscious' insofar as it implies a notion of the 
unconscious which can be assimilated to conscious thought (see Laplanche, 'La Revolution 
copemicienne', pp. xi-xii). Similarly, he questions Freud's Wo es war, sol! Jch werden for 
its reduction of the notion of a cure to strengthening the capacities of the ego and for thus 
reinforcing the self-centredness of the human subject (ibid., p. xxxv). 
11. See Laplanche's comments in 'La Revolution copemicienne', p. xxi. 
12. Claude Lefort, 'Orwell, Ie corps interpose', Passe-Present, 3 (1984), 80-97. 
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Winston's conception of his existence is one that is not at odds with terror, and as 
such it cannot function as an effective opposition to Big Brother. Instead, his 
mythic belief in a potential fusion with the other - with O'Brien (a member of 
the inner party in whom Winston mistakenly puts his trust), with the 
'Brotherhood' (the mythical underground resistance movement against Big 
Brother), with Julia (the woman with whom Winston falls in love) - singles him 
out from virtually the very beginning of the novel as someone who will quite 
naturally become complicit with the regime. I] As Lefort claims of Winston, 'qu'il 
y a quelque chose en lui qui se prete au fantasme qui gouveme totalitarisme'. 14 
Nussbaum also argues that, although 'Winston Smith is not a narcissist', he is 
nonetheless 'all too prone to narcissistic retreat and collapse' .15 
In the end, then, Winston does succumb to narcissism, to the fusion of self and 
other that forms the bedrock of Nineteen Eighty-four's conception of terror. Aside 
from the fusion of self and other by way of instances of geste and regard that 
Lefort emphasizes,t6 a key determinant in Winston's susceptibility to narcissistic 
self-centring emerges from his obsession with the past. 17 This obsession with 
trying to know and master the past is nothing less than an attempt to know and 
master the unconscious, insofar as that unconscious is perceived as an element of 
memory that has gone wrong. IS Winston's many attempts to retrieve the past both 
at a personal and a collective level (whether through his diary, in his dreams, or 
via his discussions with the 'proles') stand as evidence of his quest for a 
transcendence of the unconscious, of his desire to eradicate the unconscious by 
bringing it into line with conscious thought. Winston is revealed to be a narcissist 
after all, and thus falls prey to a conception of terror based on a promise of 
transcendence. 
13. Lefort points out that Winston is struck by a 'connection' with O'Brien very early in the 
novel. On only page 19, Orwell presents the reader with an intimation of Winston's 
totalitarian leanings: 'there was a fraction of a second when their eyes met, and for as long 
as it took to happen Winston knew - yes, he knew! - that O'Brien was thinking the same 
thing as himself' (Orwell, p. 19; cf. Lefort, p. 91). 
14. Lefort, p. 90. 
15. Nussbaum, p. 289. 
16. Lefort argues that Winston is captured 'par un regard, par un geste du bras' - the 'glances' 
and 'gestures' are those of Julia and O'Brien, while an additional gesture - of his mother 
embracing his sister - haunts him as the remembrance of a lost past. See Lefort, p. 91. 
17. Lefort claims of Winston that 'il est habite par Ie question du passe, il veut savoir' (p. 85), 
and that ultimately, for him, 'I'attrait du passe refont ainsi sourdement la croyance en 
I'immortalite' (p. 92). 
18. It is Jean-Franyois Lyotard, in a short commentary on Lefort's article, who stresses this point: 
Winston's life is one that is 'infiltre de reveries, de reves, de fantasmes, c'est-a-dire des 
formations les plus singulieres de I'inconscient' ('Glose sur la resistance', inLe Postmoderne 
explique aux en/ants: Correspondence 1982-1985 (Paris: Galilee, 1986), p. 138. 
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It is in this way that Nineteen Eighty-Jour draws a very complex picture of 
terror. At the level of the individual - of Winston - terror is conceived, on the 
one hand, as a promise of transcending the other by uniting it with the self, and on 
the other hand, as an attempt to transcend the unconscious by restoring to the self 
what has been hidden from it. 19 At the level of the collective, Orwell's conception 
of terror is more predictable - it is the terror of a totalitarian regime. But Nineteen 
Eighty-jour's great achievement remains the way that Orwell links the totalitarian 
conception of terror at the level of the state with the psyche of the individual who 
conceives of himself in opposition to that state. It is Winston's inability to 
conceive of an otherness that is truly other which in the end makes him no 
different from anyone else in the Party. 
The Remains oj the Day and the Terror of Submission 
Nineteen Eighty-four is a novel that by its very nature inspires reflection on terror 
and on the kinds of terror inherent in totalitarian regimes. By contrast, for Kazuo 
Ishiguro's understated, even quaint, romantic novel the question of terror could 
hardly seem relevant. There is certainly nothing on the surface of The Remains oj 
the Day that would appear to give rise to terrors of any kind. But if my concern 
here is to uncover modes of terror, then the mode of existence that is characterized 
by the novel's main protagonist, a butler named Stevens, is, I want to argue, one 
of terror. Perhaps my main point here is to emphasize that terror need not involve 
overtly repressive regimes, spectacular catastrophes or gross exhibitions of evil. 
Rather, I want to try to point out that terror can operate quietly, even silently, and 
even that its mode of operation can be deeply satisfying, albeit in an alarmingly 
negative way. 
In The Remains oj the Day, Stevens is wholly devoted to his master. The 
concerns of the household and the duties it is his task to perform outweigh any 
other interests he may have. Much of the novel deals with Stevens's relationship 
with another member of the household staff, Miss Kenyon. He is deeply in love 
with her, and his love is reciprocated, but he nevertheless does everything in his 
power to conceal this love from himself, for to acknowledge it would amount to a 
negligence of his duties. In other words, he places his devotion to the household 
above his personal, subjective concerns: running the household is more important 
to him than falling in love. On this basis, the theme of the novel might be 
interpreted as that of 'lost love': if only Stevens had not been so attached to his 
duties and so devoted to his master, then he would have found true love and lived 
happily ever after. Because he was unable to forgo his duties, his one chance at 
true love and happiness was lost. 
19. It is again worth drawing attention to Laplanche's criticisms of the notion of false memory 
or misremembering as that which forms the unconscious, for it is this conception of 
misremembering that guides Winston's attempts to transcend his unconscious. See 
Laplanche's criticisms in 'La Revolution copemicienne', p. xxi. 
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Renata Salecl, however, provides a rather different interpretation of the noveJ.2° 
She argues that Stevens's devotion to his duties is not a barrier to his discovery of 
love, but instead that it is only because of his devoted duty that his love arises in 
the first place. According to the logic of this argument, if Stevens declared his love 
for Miss Kenyon over and above his duties, then the love itself would vanish; it is 
only by meticulously continuing his duties to his master that his love survives. 
Salecl thus claims that it is 'useless to search in Stevens for some hidden love that 
could not come out because of the ritual he rigidly engages in - all his love is in 
the rituals'.21 
In accordance with the psychoanalytic precepts of her interpretation, Salecl 
argues that Stevens is guided in his behaviour by his ego ideal. The rituals and 
duties performed by him for his master are ones that take the place of his ego ideal. 
And Freud's words would seem to confirm that the kind of idealization in which 
Stevens is engaged is indeed a form ofbeing-in-Iove.22 His ego ideal is constituted 
by his duties, which is to say that his duties are the objects, in accordance with the 
Freudian formula, that have been 'put in the place of the ego ideal'.23 Stevens's 
performance of his household tasks over and above his personal interests is a sure 
sign that the urgings of the ego ideal have replaced those of his ego. His ego might 
thus be said, as Freud argues, to be impoverished and usurped by the interests of 
the ego ideal;24 all of Stevens's desires have been surrendered by his own ego and 
delivered up to the ideal of being a dutiful butler. 
There is, however, a further determinant here. One might think that Stevens's 
sacrifice to the ego ideal, his humble renunciation of the interests of his own ego, 
would amount to a renunciation of all self-interest. It might thus be fair to argue 
that Stevens is the very opposite of a narcissist, that he is devoted to pleasing the 
other over and above the interests of himself. On the contrary, however, in cases 
like that of Stevens, the satisfactions derived from the ego ideal are deeply 
narcissistic, for, once again with reference to Freud's arguments in the Group 
Psychology, it is no less than the ego itself that is put in the place of the ego ideal. 
The ego thus obtains a sense of deep satisfaction from its impoverishment. In other 
words, Stevens's idealized performance of his duties bolsters his ego in a way that 
is satisfyingly narcissistic. Therefore, one would be entirely mistaken to argue that 
Stevens renounces his personal interests, that he is unhappy or that he is a shell of 
a man who merely performs tasks at the behest of his master. Rather, Stevens 
20. Renata Salecl, (Per)versions of Love and Hate (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 6-33. 
21. Ibid., p. 1l. 
22. See Freud's discussion of being-in-1ove in chapter VII of Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego (1921), Penguin Freud Library, 12 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), 
pp.91-178. 
23. Such is Freud's conclusion to above chapter in Group Psychology, p. 147. 
24. Ibid., p. 144. 
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clearly derives a sense of supreme fulfilment and enjoyment from his devotion to 
the ideal, for that devotion is one that is also in accord with the narcissistic 
strivings of his own ego. 
If this is a mode of terror, and that is what I wish to argue here, then it exhibits 
many of the characteristics that were found in Nineteen Eighty-four. Primarily, the 
mode of terror in which Stevens is caught is one in which the self is identified with 
the other. Unlike Nineteen Eighty-four, however, where the unification of self and 
other was predicated on a promise of transcendence, in The Remains of the Day 
that unity is a product of submission: submission to the commands of the ego 
ideal. 
What I am therefore arguing is that Stevens lives a life of terror. Broadly 
speaking, there are three factors that define this conception of submissive terror. 
The first factor is one of personal renunciation and self-sacrifice. Because of this 
renunciation, all decisions must be deferred to an external authority - and that is 
the second determinant. The third constituent arises from the first two: that one 
enjoys self-renunciation, for this mode of terror is based on the assumption that 
one's most intimate and personal desires do, after all, coincide with those that are 
prescribed by the external authority. As a result, submission to an external 
authority is justified on the basis of its production of a deep personal satisfaction. 
If these are the constituents of submissive terror, then the character of Stevens 
satisfies all its requirements. His duties as a butler entail a complete renunciation 
of his personal desires. 25 From a psychoanalytic perspective, one could claim that 
Stevens has given up on following the urges of his id, for all his actions and 
decisions are determined by his super-ego, especially insofar as his super-ego has 
become conflated with the aspirations of his ego ideal. And inasmuch as the super-
ego is the agency of the unconscious in which is inscribed the internalization of 
external prohibitions and commands, then the second condition above is reached: 
all of Stevens's decisions and desires are deferred to an external authority, an 
externality that has been internalized in the form of a stem and demanding super-
ego. Salecl provides a Lacanian explanation for this by declaring that Stevens 
effectively 'installs himself in the place ofthe Other, from where he then acts in a 
way that prevents any risk of encountering his desire' .26 Finally, then, by acting in 
accordance with the demands of his super-ego or ego ideal, Stevens in fact 
achieves a level of deep personal satisfaction: he is convinced that the ego 
wholeheartedly desires the conditions that are prescribed for it by the super-ego. 
Thus, performing his duties gives him a deep sense of narcissistic fulfilment and 
25. See Salecl, p. II. Cf. Barry Lewis, Kazuo Ishiguro (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000), p. 94. 
26. Salecl, p. 9. 
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triumph.27 What one may have considered as Stevens's renunciation of desire is 
instead conceived by him as its fulfilment. 
For this mode of submissive terror, terror is once again a narcissistic fusion of 
self and other, though for submissive terror, the other takes on the bearings of 
Lacan's big 'Other'. Stevens's submission to the laws determined by the Other are 
again a form of terror in which the alien nature of the other is denied (whether 
these laws are those laid down by the master of the household, by Stevens's 
aspiration to live up to the model of the great butler that his father was, or as part 
of Stevens's membership of the Hayes Society - a society for elite butlers). 
Stevens can only approach the other in terms of his submission to it. By fully 
submitting to the other, he obtains narcissistic fusion with it, he 'installs himself 
in the place of the Other' (as Salecl claims).28 These characteristics designate a 
second form of terror: narcissistic submission to the other. 
The main discovery Laplanche wrests from Freud is that of an unconscious 
which necessitates, for the human being, an internal etrangerete that is maintained 
and held in place by an external etrangerete. One's recognition of the unconscious 
other within the self (das Andere) can only be made on the basis that this other is 
acknowledged in its otherness. At the same time, the acknowledgment of internal 
otherness goes hand-in-hand with an acknowledgment of other people (or the 
'other person': der Andere).29 This acknowledgment of the other - of the 
unconscious and of other people - goes to the heart of La planche's understanding 
ofthe 'other-centredness' of human subjectivity, his conviction that, for the human 
being, it is the other and not the self which is primary. 'L'inconscient', he argues, 
'n'est donc en rien un autre "moi-meme" en moi, eventuellement plus authentique 
que moi [ ... ]. II est I' autre-chose (das Andere) en moi, residu refoule de I' autre-
personne (der Andere)' .30 
With these statements in mind, could it not be argued that in The Remains of 
the Day Stevens is eminently other-centred insofar as he 'installs himself in the 
place of the Other'? While on the surface this may appear to be the case, on deeper 
inspection it becomes clear that the otherness to which Stevens submits is not one 
27. Barry Lewis astutely accounts for this sense of fulfilment by stressing Stevens's wish to 
'inhabit' his role as butler, 'to inhabit it', as Stevens himself claims, 'to the utmost' 
(Ishiguro, p. 43). He writes that 'The word "inhabit" is telling: the great butler is at home in 
the part he plays. It is home to him, not a temporary lodging' (Lewis, p. 85). 
28. Salecl, p. 9. 
29. Laplanche finds a distinction in Freud's writings between the other in general ~ das Andere 
~ and the other person ~ der Andere. The distinction is crucial for Laplanche insofar as 
he traces the otherness constitutive of the unconscious back to the child's interactions with 
(and 'seduction' by) the other person (see 'La Revolution copernicienne'). 
30. Laplanche, 'Court traite de l'inconscient', Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 48 (Autumn 
1993),69-96 (p. 90). 
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that he recognizes as truly other, but is an other which he can conceive of only on 
the basis of his being unified with it. For Stevens there is no acknowledgment of 
either the internal etrangerete of his unconscious or the external etrangerete of the 
other person. It is this refusal of the alien-ness of the other that, like Winston in 
Nineteen Eighty-four, is constitutive of terror. Both Orwell and Ishiguro discover 
the most sinister functioning of terror: that it is at its most effective when it is at 
its most silent. It is Winston's refusal to believe that he too might be capable of 
terror that ultimately ensures he, quite to the contrary, will be capable of being 
folded into the ranks of the Party and succumb to the lures of its terrors, while for 
Stevens, in Ishiguro's novel, his submission to an other which he believes to be 
utterly incapable of terror, of etrangerete, is again a sure signal that he will 
eventually conduct his life under the most severe reign of a silent terror. 
Innocence: the Incorporation of Terror 
Lucile Hadzihalilovic's film, Innocence, presents a conception of terror that 
differs markedly from those of Nineteen Eighty-four and The Remains of the Day. 
The mode of terror in Innocence is one of an alien other implanted in the human 
subject from the outside. As such, Innocence portrays a mode of terror that 
acknowledges the fundamental other-centeredness of the human being: here, the 
other is incorporated, and it is incorporated as other. 
First of all, the film itself: after going through nearly two hours of fantasy-
strangeness, of not really knowing quite where the story of the film is going or 
what kind of world is being depicted in the girls' school on which the film focuses, 
suddenly the older students are bundled onto a train - it is time for their transition 
from the completely closed world of the school (the parc) to the open world that 
exists beyond the school's gates. When the girls arrive at their destination -
another school, this time not a closed one, but instead one in which they are free 
to explore the world beyond the school - they immediately make their way to a 
sunny courtyard in which there is a fountain. The girls begin to play in the 
fountain, splashing about in an excited fashion, as if responsive to their new-found 
freedom. Then one of the main characters, Bianca (Berangere Haubruge), notices 
a boy, the first and only time in the film that a male character is given a face. 
Between Bianca and the boy there then ensues an extraordinary back-and-forth 
montage sequence of point-of-view shots and reverse-shots. They smile at each 
other: they are happy; for the first time in the film there is a sense of happiness. 
Bianca has finally left the stifling restrictions of the young girls' parc and has 
discovered something that verges on maturity: Bianca feels all at once that she has 
grown up - and it is a good feeling. 
For the girls, and for Bianca in particular, this is a moment at which maturity 
is reached - biologically, psychologically and sexually. They have arrived at the 
properly sexualized world that emerges with puberty, a sexualization that had been 
denied the girls at the parco The girls enter a world of understanding, a world in 
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which they now have the capacity to make choices and determine their actions to 
a degree that autonomous or self-determining human subjects can. 
Innocence is thus a chronicle of a childhood coming-of-age in ways that are 
strikingly similar to Laplanche's theorization of the child's passage into the adult 
world. In general terms, Laplanche theorizes this transition as one that progresses 
from non-knowledge to knowledge; the human child arrives in the world ill-
equipped with the skills and understanding needed in order to survive, and as a 
result, the child has to rely on others - other people - in order to make the 
journey towards knowledge. All of the knowledge the child gains, therefore, is 
only ever knowledge that is offered to the child by the other: the child's entry into 
the adult world can only be predicated on the teachings or commandments that are 
delivered from other people. 
These adult messages can indeed be characterized as forms of terror: they are 
traumatic intrusions into the child's world.3! These intrusions are, according to 
Laplanche, the markers of seduction: the adult continually directs demands and 
requests towards the child, even when the child is incapable of understanding 
those demands and requests. These messages that the adult directs to the child are 
received by that child, who then subsequently tries to make sense of them.32 The 
reception of messages coming from the other - seduction, per se - can be 
interpreted as the child's initial subjection to terror, as traumatic intrusions from 
the other person by means of which the child then attempts to construct the 
meanings that can give a modicum of sense to its world. For the child, this is a 
form of terror: an intrusion of the external, alien other of which the child is 
incapable of making sense. The child cannot be expected to understand these 
terroristic intrusions: at an early age, the child simply does not possess the skills 
and knowledge to enable the other's messages to be adequately translated. 
Therefore, as a result, that which fails to be translated or which is untranslatable 
falls into the unconscious: those things which are untranslatable form 'Ie noyau de 
l'inconscient', writes Laplanche, and 'sont a concevoir comme ce qui echappe aux 
premieres tentatives de l'enfant pour se construire une monde interhumain'.33 
The key factor in understanding what unfolds in Innocence thus can be said to 
arise from the fact that the girls, while at the pare, are constantly being made to 
do things - to perform tasks, to follow rules and regulations - without having 
the slightest idea of why they are being made to do such things. The restrictive 
31. Laplanche claims that 'I'intervention de I'autre necessairement traumatisante' is 
characterized by something akin to pain [douleur] (,Masochisme et theorie de la seduction 
generalisee', in La Revolution copernicienne inachevee, pp. 439-456 (p. 452). 
32. Laplanche argues that the category of the message, as he calls it, is one of his most 
significant contributions to psychoanalysis. See, for example, his Nouveaux Fondemonts de 
la psychanalyse (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987). 
33. Laplanche, 'Court traite', p. 76. 
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regIme that characterizes the parc, whereby the girls are bombarded with 
commands and messages that originate from others (their teachers, the 
headmistress, the parc's rules and customs) is thus analogous to the general 
situation of the child as theorized by Laplanche: messages are directed towards 
them which they are unable to adequately comprehend.14 
Even more troubling ~ terrifying, even ~ for the child, is that the child has 
no choice but to submit to the messages sent by the other if that child is to ever 
make sense of the interhuman world: 'Avec Ie message', Laplanche contends, 
'l'idee qu'il y a du sens existant, preexistant, propose au sujet, et dont il n'est pas 
maitre, dont il ne peut se rendre maitre qu'en s'y soumettant'.15 And so too for the 
girls in the parc ~ they have no choice but to submit to the commands given to 
them. Mademoiselle Eva (Marion Cotillard), the dance teacher at the parc, even 
remarks at one point that 'I' obeissance est Ie seul chemin qui mene au bonheur'. 
Those who fail to submit to the parc's messages are doomed to failure ~ Laura 
(Olga Peytavi-Miiller), for example, drowns while attempting to escape from the 
parc, while Alice (Lea Bridarolli) successfully escapes, but the implication is that 
she is not yet ready for the outside world. Only by obeying, by following the 
commands delivered by their teachers and the other customs of the parc, by 
submitting to them, can the girls gain knowledge and ultimately independence. 
At the end of the film, the character of Bianca is held up as the one who 
achieves a proper sense of independence ~ that is certainly how I interpret 
Innocence's magnificent closing images. Throughout the film, Bianca accepts the 
task of submitting to the teachers' discourses; she accepts and incorporates, as it 
were, the messages directed to her from other people. She ultimately masters these 
messages insofar as she acknowledges that they come from the other and that their 
alterity is maintained (she does not try to make them hers). Perhaps this capacity 
for incorporating the other's message is nowhere more evident than when a 
member of the audience at one of the dance performances the older girls engage 
in each evening throws a rose and a pair of gloves to Bianca. She receives the rose 
and gloves ~ she is the recipient of the message ~ and she tries to make sense 
of this message. Later that evening, when she has returned to her room in the parc, 
she puts one of the gloves on her hand and gently caresses her thigh. The 
connotation is clearly sexual (Bianca is attempting to understand what sexuality 
means in an adult world), but even more than this, her gesture expresses the 
attempt to make sense of the other s message. What her act indicates is her attempt 
to incorporate the other s message, to make it part of her self ~ she puts the glove 
on her hand ~ but as an alien part of herself that originates in the other person; 
34. The main figure in this regard is the character of Iris (Zoe Auclair) who constantly asks 
questions in an effort to understand the pare's rules and regulations. 
35. Laplanche, 'L'Interpretation entre determinisme et hermeneutique: une nouvelle position de 
la question', in La Revolution eopernicienne inaehevee, pp. 285-415, p. 410. 
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that is, she does not touch herself with her own hand, but with the glove that has 
been sent to her as a message from the other person. Bianca's self-caress with the 
other's glove can thus be seen as an incorporation of the other, an attempt to bring 
into herself the traumatic, alien message that originates in the other person: an 
acknowledgment of the relation of alterity that the other person has with the self. 
In this way, Innocence's mode of terror is quite distinct from those of Nineteen 
Eighty-Jour and The Remains oj the Day. While Nineteen Eighty-jour's mode of 
terror is based on a promise of transcendence that is achieved by a fusion of self 
and other, and The Remains oj the Day outlines a mode of terror in which the self 
attains unity with the other by fully submitting to the other, Innocence portrays a 
mode of terror in which terror is incorporated as other. Only by incorporating this 
terror - that is, by incorporating the traumatic messages directed by the other 
towards the self - can terror be utilized by the subject as an internal etrangerete 
that originates in and is held in place by an external etrangerete. Only by 
accepting and incorporating the terror of the etrangerete of the other can one break 
free from the terrors of narcissistic self-centredness. The narcissistic modes of 
terror - those of transcendence in Orwell and submission in lshiguro - are 
predicated on denials of terror: Winston's belief that he is against the party, an 
anti-terrorist, and Stevens's enjoyment of his own submission to his master, are 
indications that these protagonists situate themselves beyond terror, that terror is 
not something of which they are a part. Nevertheless, each of these characters is 
utterly mistaken; indeed, it is their denial that they are implicated in modes of 
terror that betrays their complicity with the overt operations of terror. 
In Innocence, on the contrary, Bianca incorporates the terrors with which she 
comes into contact. She does not try to deny or eradicate terror. She does not try 
to transcend terror, but nor does she merely submit to it. Instead, she incorporates 
terror; she takes terror into herself and makes it into something of which she is a 
part. In the same way that Innocence displays a terror which is to be incorporated 
rather than eradicated, so too is the unconscious something to be incorporated. 
There is no way of transcending the unconscious, while submitting to it tout court 
is certainly no viable way of dealing with it either. Rather, one must accept and 
acknowledge the unconscious as an other entity which resides in all of us, as an 
essential part of that which makes us human. And so too with terror: terror is also 
an essential part of that which makes us human. 
